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From	‘housekeeping’	to	‘gatekeeping’:	the	enhanced	role	of	the	company	secretary	in	the	governance	system∗				
Abstract	
	The	 role	 of	 the	 company	 secretary	 has	 been	 transformed	 from	 that	 of	 chief	administrator	 of	 a	 company	 to	 corporate	 gatekeeper.	 This	 transformation	 has	been	 driven	 by	 the	 increasing	 importance	 of	 capital	 markets	 which	 require	transparency	 and	 board	 independence	 to	 ensure	 investor	 confidence.	 The	attribute	 of	 independence	 is	 critical	 to	 performing	 the	 function	 of	 corporate	gatekeeper	by	being	chief	of	staff	to	the	chairman	and	in	managing	the	law	and	policy	compliance	programme	within	a	group	of	companies.	The	 independence	of	the	company	secretary	is	best	maintained	by	a	professional	code	that	provides	negative	criteria.	In	the	event	of	dismissal,	a	company	secretary	should	have	the	right	of	representation	to	the	board	with	disclosure	in	the	annual	report.	While	professional	 services	 firms,	 as	 external	 services	 providers,	 can	 supply	 needed	expertise,	the	attribute	of	independence	should	be	regulated	through	disclosure	of	potential	conflicts	and	obtaining	shareholder	approval.	The	law	should	further	clarify	 the	 rules	 of	 attribution	 to	 avoid	 unintended	 consequences.	 Finally,	confidentiality	protection	should	be	given	to	communications	with	the	company	secretary	 to	 encourage	 the	 use	 of	 the	 office	 by	 board	members	 for	 advice	 on	governance.		 		
Introduction			The	 company	 secretary	 is	 an	 English	 corporate	 invention	 and	 the	 office	 has	continued	 to	 this	 day	 to	 enhance	 transparency	 and	 facilitate	 board	independence.	The	removal	of	the	requirement	to	appoint	a	company	secretary	to	a	private	company	by	the	Companies	Act	2006	creates	an	opportunity	to	have	a	 sharper	 focus	on	 this	108-year-old	 corporate	office	with	 increased	corporate	governance	duties.1	This	English	 invention	of	 a	 corporate	officer	has	only	been	exported	 in	 a	 limited	way,	 notably	 to	 other	 common	 law	 jurisdictions	 such	 as	Hong	Kong	 and	 Singapore.	 China,	 as	 a	 civil	 law	 country,	 has	 also	 installed	 this	statutory	officer	in	their	company	structure.	Despite	the	legal	installation	of	this	office,	the	company	secretary’s	function	as	a	corporate	gatekeeper	has	not	been	discussed	 as	 extensively	 as	 other	 gatekeepers	 such	 as	 auditors,	 compliance	officers	and	 lawyers,2	either	 in	 the	UK	or	at	any	 transnational	 level	such	as	 the	EU	or	OECD.	The	aim	of	this	paper	is	to	explore	how	the	company	secretary,	as	a																																																									
∗	Joseph	Lee,	PhD	(London),	Senior	lecturer	in	law,	University	of	Exeter	(UK);	Visiting	Professor,	National	Taiwan	University	(Taiwan);	Principal	Investigator,	The	British	Academy	(UK).		1	CA2006,	 s	 270;	 Although	 the	 background	 thinking	 is	 under	 the	moto	 of	 ‘think	 small	 first’	 to	reduce	 red	 tape	 for	 small	 companies,	 it	 has	 the	 effect	 of	 placing	more	 emphasis	 on	 the	 public	companies’	governance.	See	DTI	Company	Law	Reform	White	Paper	(2005),	section	4.		2	In	same	countries,	public	regulators	also	perform	a	significant	role	as	corporate	gatekeeper.	In	this	 sense,	 the	 corporate	 professionals	 are	 the	 private	 corporate	 gatekeepers.	 David	 Freeman	Engstrom	 ‘Agencies	 as	 litigation	 gatekeepers’	 (2013)	 123(3)	 Yale	 Law	 Journal	 616.	 Julia	 Black	‘Entrolling	actors	in	regulatory	systems:	examples	from	UK	financial	services	regulation’	(2003)	Public	Law	63-91.	
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corporate	 professional,3	can	 perform	 an	 oversight	 function	 to	 increase	 the	impact	 on	 the	 quality	 of	 governance.	 To	 this	 end,	 the	 paper	 will	 argue	 that	 a	company	 secretary	 can	 act	 as	 a	 corporate	 gatekeeper	 who	 is	 in	 charge	 of	facilitating	 investor-led	 corporate	 governance	built	 on	 transparency	 and	board	independence.	This	role	can	be	fulfilled	by	professional	services	firms	that	have	been	 providing	 corporate	 gatekeeper	 services	 since	 the	 advent	 of	 capital	markets.	 At	 the	 transnational	 level,	 the	 company	 secretaries	 of	 multinational	companies	have	the	potential	to	shape	new	transnational	governance	since	they	manage	increasing	numbers	of	joint	law	enforcement	actions.	The	change	of	the	role	of	 the	company	secretary	can	also	have	consequences	to	the	quality	of	 the	system	 of	 governance.	 EU	 and	 other	 transnational	 regulators	 should	 not	overlook	 the	 ability	 of	 a	 company	 secretary,	 as	 a	 corporate	 gatekeeper	 in	addition	 to	 regulators	 and	 other	 corporate	 professionals,	 to	 close	 gaps	 in	governance.			There	are	four	parts	to	this	paper.	In	part	I,	the	author	will	examine	the	evolving	role	 of	 the	 company	 secretary	 from	a	mere	 servant	 to	 a	 corporate	 governance	officer,	 and	 how	 this	 office	 continues	 to	 evolve	 in	 an	 investor-led	 corporate	ecosystem	 where	 investor	 communication	 has	 become	 the	 cornerstone	 of	governance.	 In	 part	 II,	 consideration	 will	 be	 given	 to	 whether	 the	 company	secretary	 should	 also	 be	 an	 officer	 with	 independence	 equivalent	 to	 that	 of		auditors,	 lawyers,	 and	 compliance	 officers.	 If	 so,	 how	 can	 such	 independence	best	 realise	 corporate	 values	 and	 how	 can	 it	 be	 regulated?	 In	 part	 III,	 an	investigation	will	be	made	into	how	professional	services	firms,	especially	those	who	provide	multiple	corporate	services,	can	play	a	role	 in	adding	value	to	the	system	of	 governance	and	how	 independence	 can	be	maintained	 in	 the	 face	of	market	 competition.	 The	way	 in	which	 a	 company	 secretary’s	 liability	may	 be	attributable	 to	 the	 professional	 services	 firms	will	 be	 investigated	 in	 order	 to	identify	 any	 areas	 that	 need	 particular	 legislative	 attention	 to	 avoid	 any	confusing	interpretation	of	the	current	law.	In	part	IV,	the	author	will	explore	the	role	of	the	company	secretary	in	the	transnational	context	and	discuss	what	the	advantages	 and	disadvantages	 are	of	 combining	 the	 role	 of	 company	 secretary	with	that	of	the	general	counsel	office	in	multinational	groups	of	companies.				
Part	I	The	evolving	role	of	the	company	secretary				In	 this	 part,	 the	 author	 will	 give	 an	 account	 of	 how	 the	 role	 of	 the	 company	secretary	 evolves	 with	 investor-led	 governance.	 The	 company	 secretary	 is	 an	officer	of	 the	 company	and	has	 served	an	 important	 role	 in	 the	administration	and	management	 of	 the	 company’s	 affairs.4	The	 role	 has	 changed	 from	 a	mere	servant	of	the	company	to	a	statutory	officer	who	assumes	managerial	functions																																																									3	Other	corporate	professionals	are	auditors,	corporate	lawyers,	and	compliance	officers.	J	Coffee	
Gatekeepers.	The	role	of	the	professions	in	corporate	governance	 (OUP	Oxford	2006).	R	Kraakman		‘Gatekeepers:	 The	 anatomy	 of	 a	 third-party	 enforcement	 strategy’	 (1986)	 2	 Journal	 of	 Law	Economics	 and	 Organization	 53–104;	 Dalvinder	 Singh	 ‘Role	 of	 external	 auditors	 in	 bank	supervision:	A	supervisory	gatekeeper’	(2013)	47(1)	The	International	Lawyer	65-98.	4	Panorama	Developments	(Guildford)	Ltd	v	Fidelis	Furnishing	Fabrics	Ltd	[1971]	2	QB	711	(CA).		
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such	 as	 chief	 of	 staff	 to	 the	 chairman	 or	 advisor	 to	 the	 board.	 The	 role	 of	company	secretary	has	a	shorter	history	than	that	of	corporate	auditor	-	another	corporate	 gatekeeper.	 The	 UK	 did	 not	 include	 the	 company	 secretary	 in	 the	Companies	Act	1855	where	the	principle	of	limited	liability	was	first	introduced.5	In	Barnnett,	Hoares	and	Co	v	South	London	Tramways	Co,6	immediately	 after	 the	principle	of	 limited	 liability	was	 introduced	in	that	Act,	Lord	Esher	M.R.	said	 ‘A	secretary	is	a	mere	servant;	his	position	is	that	he	is	to	do	what	he	is	told,	and	no	person	can	assume	that	he	has	any	authority	to	represent	anything	at	all…’.	It	is	important	 to	 note	 that	 there	 was	 no	 legal	 requirement	 in	 1887	 to	 have	 a	company	secretary	which	is	why	Lord	Esher	thought	that	this	non-statutory	role	was		a	mere	servant.	The	company	secretary	did	not	receive	an	official	title	until	the	early	1900s	when	British	stock	exchanges	were	becoming	more	international	and	 offered	 British	 companies’	 shares	 abroad7.	 The	 Companies	 Act	 1908	required	 each	 company	 to	 appoint	 a	 company	 secretary,	while	 the	 Companies	Act	 1929	 subsequently	 prescribed	 the	 duties	 and	 responsibilities	 of	 the	 office.	The	 creation	 of	 such	 a	 statutory	 corporate	 officer	 has	 led	 to	 the	 judicial	recognition	of	the	company	secretary	with	the	authority,	usually	only	conferred	on	directors,	to	bind	the	company	with	third	parties.		In	Panorama	Developments	
(Guildford)	 Ltd.	 v	 Fidelis	 Furnishing	 Fabrics	 Ltd,	8	the	 court	 recognised	 the	company	 secretary	 as	 an	 officer	 of	 the	 company	 having	 authority	 to	 bind	 the	company	with	third	parties.	 In	the	same	case,	Salmon	L.J.	described	a	company	secretary	 as	 the	 chief	 administrative	 officer	 of	 the	 company	 but	 left	 open	 the	question	 whether	 he	 would	 have	 any	 authority	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 commercial	management	 of	 the	 company.	 Since	 then,	 the	 emphasis	 on	 the	 function	 of	 the	company	secretary	has	shifted	to	legal	compliance.			Nowadays,	 capital	 markets	 require	 two	 critical	 confidence-building	 measures,	transparency9	and	 board	 independence10,	 for	 financial	 participation	 of	 the	investor.	The	demand	for	transparency	has	 led	to	the	development	of	 laws	and	regulations	requiring	disclosure	through	filing	with	various	agencies	and	timely	announcements	through	recognised	channels.	Board	independence	has	called	for	increasing	numbers	of	non-executive	directors	on	a	board	to	monitor	checks	and																																																									5	Companies	Act	1855,	s	1.		6	(1887)	18	Q.E.D.	815	7	Ranald	Michie	The	London	Stock	Exchange:	A	history	(OUP	Oxford	1998)	70-142.	8	Panorama	Developments	(Guildford)	Ltd	v	Fidelis	Furnishing	Fabrics	Ltd	[1971]	2	QB	711	(CA).	9	L.	 Lowenstein	 ‘Financial	 Transparency	 and	 Corporate	 Governance:	 You	 Manage	 What	 You	Measure’	(1996)	96	Colum.	L.	Rev.	1335,	1361–1362;	R.	La	Porta,	F.	Lopez-de-Silanes,	A.	Shleifer	and	Robert	Vishny,	"Legal	Determinants	of	External	Finance"	(1997)	52	J.	Fin.	1131;	R.	La	Porta,	F.	 Lopez-de-Silanes,	 A.	 Shleifer	 and	 R.	 Vishny,	 "Investor	 Protection	 and	 Corporate	 Valuation"	(2002)	62	J.	Fin.	1147.	10	MJ	 Jensen	 &	 WH	 Meckling	 	 ‘Theory	 of	 the	 firm:	 Managerial	 behavior,	 agency	 costs,	 and	ownership	structure’	(1976)	3	Journal	of	Financial	Economics,	305–360;	D	Higgs	Review	of	the	role	and	effectiveness	of	non-	executive	directors	(2003)	London:	DTI;	KG	Corley	‘Examining	the	non-executive	 director’s	 role	 from	 a	 non-agency	 theory	 perspective:	 Implications	 arising	 from	the	Higgs	Report’	(2005)	16	British	Journal	of	Management,	1–4;	EU	Commission	On	the	role	of	non-executive	 or	 supervisory	 directors	 of	 listed	 companies	 and	 on	 the	 committees	 of	 the	(supervisory)	 board.	 Commission	 recommendation,	 2005/162/EC;	 J	 Gordon	 ‘The	 Rise	 of	Independent	Directors	in	the	United	States,	1950–2005:	Of	Shareholder	Value	and	Stock	Market	Prices’	(2007)	59	Stanford	Law	Review,	1465–1568.		
	 4	
balances	 in	 corporate	 administration.	 The	 traditional	 role	 of	 the	 company	secretary	 to	 act	 as	 the	 company’s	 chief	 administrative	 officer	 for	 filing	documents	 with	 the	 Registrar	 of	 Companies	 House	 continues	 today.	 The	increasing	 requirement	 to	 disclose	 corporate	 information	 through	 document	filings	 and	 timely	 announcements	 has	 made	 this	 administrative	 office	indispensable	for	a	company’s	operations	in	a	rule-based	market	economy.	The	role	of	the	company	secretary	in	the	UK	has	gained	greater	importance	than	was	originally	 intended,	 especially	 in	 listed	 companies	which	 need	 to	 comply	with	law	 and	 policy	 to	 mitigate	 exposure	 to	 legal	 and	 reputational	 risk.11	This	
increased	responsibility	was	not	a	result	of	the	direct	duties	imposed	on	the	office	
by	 the	 law,	 or	 by	 providing	 it	 with	more	 direct	 legal	 powers	 to	 exercise	 against	
other	officers	of	the	company.	The	driving	 force	 for	 the	 increased	 importance	of	the	company	secretary	has	been	the	developments	 in	the	law	requiring	greater	transparency	 and	 more	 precise	 governance	 through	 internal	 checks	 and	balances.	These	include	splitting	the	roles	of	chairman	and	CEO,	and	the	demand	for	greater	corporate	social	responsibility	that	is	now	required	by	law,	and	policy	compliance	throughout	the	corporate	groups.12			The	UK	Corporate	Governance	Code,	a	soft-law	operating	on	the	basis	of	‘comply	or	 explain’,	13	epitomises	 a	 de-legalised	 approach	 that	 enhances	 the	 role	 of	 the	company	 secretary	 in	 the	 facilitation	 of	 board	 independence. 14 	Since	independent	 directors	 play	 a	 constantly	 increasing	 role	 in	 corporate	governance,15	through	 their	 close	 involvement	 with	 the	 board	 by	 attending	board		and	other	committee	meetings,	the	company	secretary	is	able	to	act	as	an	interface	between	the	board	and	shareholder	meetings	–	between,	for	example,	the	 senior	 independent	 director	 and	 the	 minority	 shareholders.	 In	 an	increasingly	devolved	governance	system	where	independent	committees	carry	out	functions	with	a	primary	aim	of	removing	directors’	conflicts	of	interest,	the	company	secretary	can	deliver	confidence	to	investors	by	acting	as	an	interface	between	the	committee	and	the	chairman	(an	independent	role).	Risks	identified	in	 committee	 meetings	 can	 be	 fed	 through	 the	 company	 secretary	 to	 the	chairman.16			
																																																								11	As	stated	in	Re	Maidstone	Buildings	Provisions	Ltd	[1971]1	W.L.R.	1085,	at	1092	that	‘	so	far	as	the	 position	 of	 a	 secretary	 as	 such	 is	 concerned,	 it	 is	 established	 beyond	 all	 question	 that	 a	secretary,	while	performing	the	duties	appropriate	to	the	office	of	secretary,	is	not	concerned	in	the	management	of	the	company.	Equally	I	think	he	is	not	concerned	in	carrying	on	the	business	of	the	company’	12	S	 Idowu	 ‘Corporate	 social	 responsibility	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 corporate	 secretaries’	 in	 S	Idowu	and	W	Filho	(eds)	Professionals’	perspectives	of	CSR	 	(Springer	Verlage	Berlin	Heiderlberg	2009)	49-70.	13	UK	Corporate	Governance	Code		2014	(CG	Code),	4.		14		K	Keasey,	H	Short,		&	M	Wright	‘The	development	of	corporate	governance	codes	in	the	UK’	In	K.	 	Keasey,	 S.	 Thompson,	&	M.	Wright	 (Eds.),	 Corporate	 governance:	Accountability,	 enterprise	and	international	comparisons	(2005	John	Wiley	&	Sons:	Chichester)	21–42.		15	Derek	Higgs,	‘Review	of	the	role	and	effectiveness	of	non-executive	directors’		January	2003.	16	The	 secretary	 tends	 to	 serve	 a	 longer	 term	 than	 the	 board	 directors;	 and	 can	 thus	 offer	 a	historical	view,	in	the	tradition	of	the	company,	to	both	the	board	and	investors.	
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Services	 provided	 by	 company	 secretaries	 can	 enhance	 the	 effectiveness	 of	independent	 directors	 in	 the	 governance	 system.17	Assisting	 the	 non-executive	chairman	 in	 the	 selection	 and	 appointment	 of	 non-executive	 directors	 and	providing	an	induction	and	training	programme	to	new	directors18	and	advice	to	non-executive	 directors,	 and	 assisting	 the	 non-executive	 chairman	 conducting	board	 evaluation	 can	 bring	 confidence	 to	 the	 investors.	 	 These	 responsibilities	increase	 investor	 confidence,	 which	 reduces	 the	 cost	 of	 raising	 capital.19	The	reduction	 of	 capital	 results	 in	 value-creation	 to	 companies.	20	These	 examples	show	 how	 the	 non-statutory	 Code	 can	 act	 as	 a	 catalyst	 for	 providing	 valuable	corporate	 secretarial	 services	 to	 companies	 that	 benefit	 both	 investors	 and	stakeholders.21		In	 2006,	 the	 Companies	 Act	 removed	 the	 requirement	 to	 appoint	 a	 company	secretary	 in	 private	 companies.	 The	 Act	 requires	 public	 companies	 to	 have	 a	company	secretary,	but	allows	private	companies	 to	decide	whether	or	not	 the	position	 is	 required	 according	 to	 their	 own	 constitution.22	This	 change	 in	 the	requirement	 for	 private	 companies	 was	 due	 to	 the	 streamlining	 of	 private	companies’	administrative	burdens	included	in	the	law,	resulting	in	fewer	filing	and	reporting	requirements	for	private	companies.23	The	Corporate	Governance	Code	does	not	apply	to	private	companies	because	board	independence	is	less	of	an	 issue	 for	 them.	 Policy	 compliance	 to	 mitigate	 exposure	 to	 reputational	damage	primarily	concerns	listed	companies.	Private	companies	do	not	operate	in	 other	 jurisdictions	 through	 subsidiary	 operations	 so	 have	 less	 concern	 for	
																																																								17	Principle	A.5.3	of	 the	CG	Code	 states	 that	 a	 company	 secretary	 should	be	 ‘responsible	 to	 the	board	for	ensuring	that	board	procedures	are	complied	with.’	18	ICSA	Guidance	on	induction	of	directors,	Guidance	Notes	June	2012.	https://www.icsa.org.uk/assets/files/pdfs/guidance/Guidance%20notes%202012/Induction%20of%20directors.pdf	19	Romilda	Mazzotta	&	 	Stefania	Veltri	 ‘The	relationship	between	corporate	governance	and	the	cost	 of	 equity	 capital.	 Evidence	 from	 the	 Italian	 stock	 exchange’,	 (2014)	 18	 Journal	 of	Management	Governance	419–448;	K	Chen,	 Z.	 Chen,	 and	K	Wei	 	 ‘Legal	protection	of	 investors,	corporate	 governance,	 and	 the	 cost	 of	 equity	 capital’	 (2009)	 15	 Journal	 of	 Corporate	 Finance		273–89.	20	Regarding	 one	 of	 the	 causes	 of	 the	 2007-09	 financial	 meltdown,	 it	 has	 been	 stated	 that	"Sometimes	what	the	directors	of	financial	institutions	were	being	asked	to	consider	was	just	so	complicated	that	a	lot	of	the	non-execs	didn’t	understand	what	was	being	suggested,	and	then	it	became	difficult	for	them	to	question	anything."	In	such	situations,	the	company	secretary	can	act	as	 a	 filter	 to	 review	 the	 relevant	 documents	 and	 determine	 whether	 the	 right	 types	 of	information	 have	 been	 provided	 to	 the	 directors	who,	 by	 definition,	 are	 not	 involved	with	 the	company	on	a	daily	basis.	21	Principle	A.5	of	 the	CG	Code	addresses	 ‘information	and	professional	development’,	 and	 the	supporting	 principles	 state,	 ‘Under	 the	 direction	 of	 the	 chairman,	 the	 company	 secretary’s	responsibilities	 include	 ensuring	 good	 information	 flows	within	 the	 board	 and	 its	 committees	and	 between	 senior	management	 and	 non-executive	 directors,	 as	well	 as	 facilitating	 induction	and	 assisting	 with	 professional	 development	 as	 required.	 The	 company	 secretary	 should	 be	responsible	for	advising	the	board	through	the	chairman	on	all	governance	matters.’	22	In	Singapore,	a	company	secretary	is	required	for	both	public	and	private	companies.		23	David	Milman	 ‘The	 regulation	 of	 private	 companies	 in	 UK	 law:	 current	 policy	 developments	and	recent	judicial	rulings’	(2009)	257	Company	Law	Newsletter		1-4.	
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subsidiary	governance.	For	 these	reasons,	whether	a	company	secretary	would	bring	value	to	private	companies	can	be	decided	by	their	members.24				
Part	II	Company	secretary	as	an	independent	gatekeeper		The	company	secretary,	as	a	corporate	governance	officer	who	aims	at	fulfilling	the	 corporate	 transparency	 requirement	 and	 facilitating	 board	 independence,	should	retain	the	critical	attribute	of	independence	as	do	other	gatekeepers	such	as	the	auditor,	the	lawyer,	and	the	compliance	officer.	However,	this	attribute	of	independence	should	be	regulated	in	order	to	best	realise	governance	goals.			
Compliance	officer			As	mentioned,	 transparency	 is	 an	 indispensable	 element	 of	modern	 corporate	governance,	and	transparency	has	been	translated	into	various	requirements	for	filing,	 reporting	 of	 law	 and	 policy	 compliance,	 and	 timely	 announcement.	Company	directors	and	company	secretaries,	as	officers	of	the	company,	assume	filing	 duties	 under	 various	 laws.	 These	 filing,	 reporting	 and	 announcing	requirements	 require	 independent	 judgment	 to	 be	 exercised.	 For	 instance,	complying	with	accounting	rules,25	complying	with	rules	specifically	designed	to	protect	 the	 shareholders	 ie	 the	pre-emptive	 rights	 regime,26	understanding	 the	operations	of	nominee	companies	to	identify	rightful	investors,27	the	application	of	proxy	rules	to	increase	shareholder	engagement28	and	proactive	development	of	governance	protocol	to	hedge	risks	stemming	from	subsidiary	operations,29	all	demand	a	 skilled	governance	officer.	 	 In	 future,	 companies	may	be	 required	 to	make	disclosures	under	the	freedom	of	information	law	if	they	carry	out	works	that	 are	 categorised	 as	 public	 services.30	Independent	 judgment	 would	 be	needed	to	determine	issues	concerning	disclosure	requirements.																																																											24	Private	companies	can	determine	in	their	own	constitutions	whether	to	utilise	such	an	office	in	delivering	its	organisational	objectives.	According	to	Companies	House	statistics,	the	number	of	companies	incorporated	without	a	company	secretary	since	6	April	2008	has	increased	greatly.		25	Company	secretaries	must	ensure	 that	 companies’	account	 records	are	prepared	 in	 the	 form	required	by	company	law	and	accounting	standards.	Corporate	governance	structures	also	affect	the	 accounting	 decisions.	 See	 Tamer	 Elshandidy	 &	 Ahmed	 Hassanein	 ‘Do	 IFRS	 and	 board	 of	directors’	 independence	 affect	 accounting	 conservatism?’	 (2014)24(16)	 Applied	 Financial	
Economics,	1091–1102.	26	Chapter	3	of	CA	2006	on	shareholders’	rights	on	preemption.		27	For	the	policy	discussion	on	indirect	investors’	enforcement	of	corporate	governance	see	RC	Nolan		‘Indirect	Investors:	A	Greater	Say	in	the	Company?’	(2003)	3(1)	Journal	of	Corporate	Law	Studies,	73-121.	28		Tsjalle	van	der	Burg	and	Aloys	Prinz	‘Empowering	small	shareholders:	a	comparison	of	three	instruments’	 (2006)14(5)	 Corporate	 Governance	 406-417;	 Paolo	 Santella,	 Enrico	 Baffi,	 Carlo	Drago,	&	Dino	Lattuca	‘Legal	obstacles	to	institutional	investor	activism	in	the	EU	and	in	the	US’	(2012)	vol	23(2)	European	Business	Law	Review	257-307.		29	Geoffrey	C.	Kiel,	Kevin	Hendry	 and	Gavin	 J.	Nicholson	 ‘Corporate	 governance	options	 for	 the	local	subsidiaries	of	multinational	enterprises’	(2006)	vol	14(6)	Corporate	Governance	568-579.		30	Simone	Mezzacapo	 	 ‘The	 right	 of	 access	 to	 public	 bodies’	 records	 in	 Italy	 and	 UK	 “Actio	 Ad	Exhibendum”	and	freedom	of	information	risks	and	opportunities	for	private	sector	companies’	(2006)17	(4)	European	Business	Law	Review	959-979.	
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Furthermore,	there	are	other	regulations	aiming	at	removing	directors’	conflicts	of	 interest	 and	 preventing	 directors’	 self-dealing.	 The	 duty	 of	 enforcing	 these	regulations	 internally	 falls	on	 the	company	secretary	who	shields	 the	company	from	insider	misconduct.	Under	the	Financial	Services	and	Markets	Act	2000,31	the	 company	 secretary	 also	 has	 a	 role	 in	 implementing	 and	 communicating	procedures	for	listed	company	directors	to	comply	with	the	Model	Code	on	share	dealing.	To	prevent	insider	dealing	by	directors,32	prior	reporting	and	obtaining	clearance	 from	 a	 non-executive	 director	 should	 pass	 through	 the	 company	secretary	so	that	a	record	can	be	kept	of	any	communication.			In	 some	 companies,	 company	 secretaries	 act	 also	 as	 a	 gatekeeper	 to	 prevent	illegal	political	donations.33	The	UK	Companies	Act	prohibits	political	donations	by	 UK	 registered	 companies	 and	 subsidiaries	 of	 the	 ultimate	 UK	 holding	companies,	 unless	 they	 are	 authorised	 by	 shareholder	 resolutions	 in	 a	 general	meeting.34	The	 company	 secretary	 needs	 to	 be	 familiar	 with	 the	 operations	 of	subsidiary	companies	both	at	home	and	abroad35	in	order	to	design	an	effective	reporting	 line	 so	 that	 shareholder	 resolutions	 can	 be	 obtained	 in	 a	 timely	manner36	and	 meet	 disclosure	 requirements.37 	Through	 internal	 corporate	governance	 protocol	 or	 a	 subsidiary’s	 company	 constitution,	 group	 companies	can	 be	 required	 to	 return	 a	 certificate	 to	 the	 holding	 company	 secretary	 each	year	stating	either	that	no	payment	has	been	made	or	providing	details	when	a	payment	 has	 taken	 place.	 The	 company	 secretary	 is	 the	 ‘go	 to’	 person	 and	oversees	 reporting	 duties	 for	 subsidiaries.	 These	 results	 are	 then	 reported	annually	to	the	audit	committee	of	the	company	as	well	as	in	an	interim	report	to	the	committee	of	independent	directors.38		
	
Chief	of	staff	to	the	chairman			For	 listed	 companies,	 investor	 confidence	 is	 increased	 by	 the	 company	secretary’s	 role	 of	 enhancing	 the	 monitoring	 and	 advisory	 functions	 of	 non-executive	directors,	in	a	similar	way	to	the	greater	independence	of	directors.39	To	 whom	 a	 company	 secretary	 reports	 makes	 a	 difference	 to	 the	 governance																																																									31	S	96B,	The	Financial	Services	and	Markets	Act	2000.	32	S	 Djankov,	 R.	 La	 Porta,	 F.	 Lopez-de-Silanes,	 and	 A.	 Shleifer	 ‘The	 law	 and	 economics	 of	 self-dealing’	(2008)	Journal	of	Financial	Economics	430–65.	33	Jack	 Davies	 ‘From	 gentlemanly	 expectations	 to	 regulatory	 principles:	 a	 history	 of	 insider	dealing	in	the	UK:	Part	1’	(2015)	36(5)	Company	Law	132-143.	34 	Richard	 Williams	 	 ‘Regulating	 political	 donations	 by	 companies:	 challenges	 and	misconceptions’	(2012)	75(6)	Modern	Law	Review	951-980.	35	Companies	 Act	 2006	 Part	 14.	 	 A	 holding	 company	 is	 permitted	 to	 seek	 authorisation	 of	donations	 and	 expenditure	 in	 respect	 of	 both	 the	 holding	 company	 itself	 and	 one	 or	 more	subsidiaries	through	a	single	approved	resolution.		36	Companies	Act	2006	Part	14	s	366.	37 	Under	 the	 Large	 and	 Medium-sized	 Companies	 and	 Groups	 (Accounts	 and	 Reports)	Regulations	 2008,	 Directors’	 reports	 must	 disclosure	 any	 relevant	 political	 donations	 or	expenditures.	SI	2008/410	7	Schs	3,4,	and	5.		38	This	is	the	current	practice	of	the	British	American	Tobacco.	It	requires	that	any	donation	must	be	 authorised	by	 the	board	of	 the	 company.	 Such	 a	 donation	must	 be	 fully	 documented	 in	 the	company’s	books.	39	Rafel	 Crespí-Cladera	 and	 Bartolomé	 Pascual-Fuster	 ‘Does	 the	 independence	 of	 independent	directors	matter?’	(2014)	28(1)	Journal	of	Corporate	Finance	116-134.		
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system.	In	the	UK,	the	office	of	the	company	secretary	is	often	established	under	the	non-executive	Chairman’s	office	-	acting	as	chief	of	staff	 to	chairman.40	This	coincides	 with	 several	 oversight	 functions	 with	 the	 Chairman-	 including	 the	responsibility	 of	 conducting	 the	 board	 evaluation. 41 	The	 attribute	 of	independence,	by	not	working	under	the	control	of	the	executive	office,	enhances	the	 functions	 of	 the	 non-executive	 directors	 whose	 major	 role	 is	 to	 remove	conflicts	of	 interest	of	the	executive	directors.	Since	neither	the	auditor	nor	the	internal	or	external	lawyers	attend	board	meetings	and	have	no	direct	access	to	the	 chairman	 and	 other	 non-executive	 directors,	 the	 company	 secretary	 as	compliance	officer	has	a	unique	gatekeeping	role.	This	role	has	been	recognised	as	 long	 ago	 as	 1993	 in	 the	 Cadbury	 Report,	 which	 recommended	 that	 the	company	 secretary	 should	 give	 guidance	 to	 the	 board	 on	 board	 members’	responsibilities.	 Board	members	 should	 have	 access	 to	 the	 company	 secretary	for	such	guidance	and	advice.	In	particular,	the	chairman,	who	is	responsible	for	the	 functioning	 of	 the	 board,	 should	 have	 strong	 support	 from	 the	 company	secretary.	 The	 company	 secretary’s	 attribute	 of	 independence	would	 not	 have	been	 as	 necessary	 if	 board	 meetings	 were	 simply	 a	 management	 discussion	forum	without	 the	 aim	 of	 checks	 and	 balances	 for	 investors.	 For	 instance,	 the	senior	non-executive	directors	should	be	the	channel	for	a	minority	shareholder	who	 wishes	 to	 communicate	 with	 the	 board.	 Combining	 the	 roles	 of	 law	 and	policy	 compliance,	 the	 company	 secretary	 is	 in	 a	 position	 to	 detect	 insider	misconduct	through	an	effective	reporting	system	and	can	‘whistle-blow’	insider	misconduct	to	the	chairman.42			One	of	 the	appraisal	criteria	 for	the	performance	of	a	company	secretary	 is	 the	effectiveness	 of	 internal	 controls.	 If	 the	 internal	 control	 system	 has	 failed,	 the	board	 can	 reprimand	 the	 company	 secretary	 publicly	 and	 thus	 deter	 reckless	conduct	by	members	of	the	executive	team.					
Enforcement	of	independence			As	 a	 gatekeeper	 and	 a	 business	 advisor,	 a	 company	 secretary	 must	 exercise	independent	 judgment	 to	 provide	 value	 to	 the	 company.	 For	 instance,	 their	responsibility	for	filing	and	reporting	to	regulators	and	the	revenue	office	carries	over	 into	 a	 duty	 to	 promote	 the	 success	 of	 the	 company	 as	 an	 officer	 and	 an	employee	who	ensures	 compliance	with	 statutory	duties.	A	 company	 secretary	would	be	held	liable	if	he	or	she	failed	to	take	steps	to	prevent	the	contravention	of	statutory	provisions,	such	as	 the	board	 failing	 to	make	trading	disclosures.43	When	 company	 secretaries	 assist	 the	 non-executive	 directors	 to	 enhance	 their	monitoring	 and	 advisory	 roles,	 they	 must	 act	 independently	 of	 the	 executive																																																									40	Caroline	Newsholme	‘FRC	guidance	on	board	effectiveness’	(2011)	35(2)	Company	Secretary’s	Review	14-15.		41	OECD,	Corporate	Governance	Principle	VI	E4;	UK	Corporate	Governance	Code	Section	B.6.			42	Indira	Carr,	David	Lewis	 ‘Combating	corruption	 through	employment	 law	and	whistleblower	protection’	(2010)	39(1)	Industrial	Law	Journal	52-52;	Peter	Yeoh		‘Whistleblowing:	motivations,	corporate	self-regulation,	and	the	law’	(2014)	56(6)	International	Journal	of	Law	&	Management	459-474.	43	CA	06	s	84(1).		
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directors	 in	 advising	 the	 non-executive	 chairman	 and	 the	 independent	committees.44			As	a	general	duty,	UK	law	requires	directors	to	act	independently	by	exercising	unfettered	 judgment.45	Similarly,	 a	 UK	 auditor	 certifying	 a	 company’s	 accounts	and	directors’	reports	should	also	act	independently.46		No	such	duty	is	imposed	in	law	on	the	company	secretary.	Whether	such	a	duty	should	be	legally	imposed	on	 the	 company	 secretary	 depends	 on	 their	 functions	 vis-à-vis	 the	 board,	 the	organizational	 objectives,	 and	 corporate	 governance	 agenda.	 The	 company	secretary	may	act	as	chief	of	staff	 to	 the	non-executive	chairman,	an	advisor	to	the	 board,	 a	 critical	 appraiser	 of	 board	 members’	 roles,	 a	 third	 person	 in	 a	chairman-CEO	 relationship,	 an	 interface	 between	 the	 board	 and	 the	shareholders,	a	gatekeeper	for	corporate	governance.	If	these	roles	are	to	remain	
open	for	organizational	 innovation,	the	duty	of	 independence	does	not	need	to	be	
legally	 prescribed.	 This	 way	 would	 allow	 companies	 to	 design	 the	 job	descriptions	 freely	 without	 being	 caught	 out	 unnecessarily	 by	 the	 strict	 legal	rules.47	Hence,	a	code	of	conduct	with	a	situational	approach	to	 the	meaning	of	‘independence’	 –	using	 the	negative	 criteria	 as	 the	Corporate	Governance	does	for	 independent	 directors	 -	 can	 be	 issued.48	In	 addition,	 there	 can	 also	 be	systems	 and	 processes	 to	 ensure	 the	 quality	 of	 independence,	 notably,	 on	 the	appointment	to,	and	removal	from	office.49					If	 the	 company	 secretary	 is	 expected	 to	be	a	 corporate	gatekeeper	 in	a	 similar	way	 as	 an	 auditor,	 the	 appointment	 and	 removal	 of	 an	 auditor	 could	 offer	 an	equivalent	 way	 of	 proceeding.	 Thus,	 since	 an	 individual	 director	 cannot	unilaterally	dismiss	an	appointed	auditor,	an	individual	director	should	also	not	be	able	to	remove	the	company	secretary,	leaving	only	the	board	with	the	ability	to	appoint	or	remove	the	company	secretary.	As	 the	 law	places	greater	control	on	 the	 appointment	 and	 removal	 of	 a	 company’s	 auditor	 for	 greater	 investor	confidence,	 auditor	 rotation,	 the	 control	 of	 auditors’	 remuneration,	 control	procedures	 for	 limiting	 auditors’	 liabilities	 to	 the	 company,	 and	 shareholder	participation	 in	 appointment	 and	 removal	 processes	 all	 help	 to	 ensure	 auditor	independence.	 Although	 there	 is	 no	 hard	 law	 in	 the	 UK	 giving	 the	 effect	 of	regulating	 a	 company	 secretary’s	 independence,	 the	UK	Corporate	Governance	Code	 recommends	 that	 only	 the	 board	 should	 have	 the	 ability	 to	 appoint	 and	remove	a	company	secretary;	an	individual	director	should	not	be	able	to	do	so	unilaterally.50																																																										44	UK	Corporate	Governance	Code	B.5.2.	45	CA	06	s	173.	46	APB	 Ethical	 Standard	 1	 (revised)	 on	 integrity,	 objectivity,	 and	 independence	 (2008),	http://www.frc.org.uk/images/uploaded/documents/ES1%20-%20v5%20clean.pdf.	47	Principles-based	regulation	can	be	considered.	See	Julia	Black,	Martyn	Hopper	&	Christa	Band	‘Making	a	success	of	Principles-based	regulation’	(2007)	1(3)	Law	and	Financial	Markets	Review	191-206.	48	The	Code	of	Corporate	Governance	uses	the	same	situational	approach	to	define	when	a	non-executive	director	is	not	independent.			49	Some	 lessons	 can	 be	 learnt	 from	 auditor’s	 appointment	 and	 removal	 to	 maintain	 audit	independence.	 See	 Reiner	 Quick	 ‘EC	 Green	 Paper	 proposals	 and	 audit	 quality’	 (2012)	 9(1)	Accounting	in	Europe	17-38.	50	UK	Corporate	Governance	Code	B.5.2.	
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	A	 company	 secretary	 can	 be	 a	 permanent	 employee	 of	 a	 company,	 unlike	 an	auditor	(a	contractor)	or	a	company	director	of	a	listed	company,	whose	term	of	office	 is	usually	based	on	a	 service	 contract	 of	 some	 limited	period.	 Subjecting	company	 secretaries	 to	 similar	 controls	 could	 disrupt	 the	 administrative	operation	of	companies,	including	the	strict	filing	and	reporting	duties	required	by	 the	 law.	 If	 the	 removal	 and	 appointment	 of	 a	 company	 secretary	 requires	shareholder	approval	at	a	general	meeting,51	the	board	will	be	unable	to	quickly	suspend	a	company	secretary	who	 is	 found	to	be	 in	default	of	compliance	with	the	law	or	of	his	or	her	contractual	or	other	duties	to	the	company.	In	an	interim	period,	 such	 a	 company	 may	 need	 to	 fulfil	 its	 filing	 duties	 urgently,	 and	convening	a	meeting	to	obtain	approval	of	the	company’s	shareholders	can	cause	missed	 filing	 deadlines,	with	 a	 consequent	 contravention	 of	 the	 law	 for	which	directors	would	be	liable.52				In	 this	way,	although	the	governance	of	an	auditor’s	 independence	offers	some	lessons	for	regulating	the	independence	of	the	company	secretary,	the	auditor’s	model	may	not	be	entirely	appropriate	for	the	company	secretary.	Auditors	have	the	right	to	make	representations	to	the	shareholders	who	vote	on	the	question	of	 their	 removal.53	A	 similar	 arrangement	 could	be	 set	 up	 for	 the	 removal	 of	 a	company	secretary.	Prior	to	the	authorisation	of	their	removal,	they	can	make	a	written	 or	 oral	 representation	 to	 the	 board.	 Since	 their	 removal	 is	 not	 by	ordinary	resolution,	a	representation	to	the	general	meeting	may	not	be	justified.	A	representation	can	be	included	in	the	company’s	annual	report.			This	 soft	 law	 approach	 to	 regulating	 the	 role	 of	 company	 secretary	 with	 the	emphasis	on	disclosing	company	policy	as	well	as	setting	up	formal	procedures	for	appointment	and	removal	would	allow	independence	to	be	enhanced	within	the	board	and	the	company.					
Part	III	The	prospects	and	legal	challenges	of	provisional	services	firms			
Professional	services	firms			It	is	debatable	whether	a	permanent	employee	or	a	contracting	professional	firm	would	 better	 fulfil	 the	 role	 of	 gatekeeper.	 An	 employee	 company	 secretary	 is	closer	and	more	integrated	with	the	board	and	the	company	than	an	auditor.	The	company	secretary	has	closer	proximity	to	the	shareholders,	hence	is	in	a	better	position	 to	 act	 as	 spokesperson	 for	 the	 board	 in	 communicating	 with	shareholders.	 An	 employee	 company	 secretary	 holds	 a	 longer	 tenure	 than	executive	directors	and,	having	experienced	both	good	and	bad	times,	 is	 	also	a	better	 repository	 of	 corporate	 memory	 which	 is	 invaluable	 for	 providing	guidance	to	a	board.	54																																																										51	This	is	currently	required	for	a	removal	of	the	auditor.		52	CA	2006	s	541.		53	CA	2006	s	511(3)	54 The	 Company	 Secretary:	 Building	 trust	 through	 governance,	 2014	 ICSA		https://www.icsa.org.uk/products-and-services/knowledge-and-guidance/research/the-company-secretary-report	
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	On	the	other	hand,	because	many	corporate	gatekeeping	functions	are	now	being	taken	 up	 by	 outside	 contractors,	 professional	 firms	 can	 provide	 company	secretarial	services.	In	fact,	private	companies,	and	also	some	listed	companies,	have	 long	 been	 using	 professional	 services	 firms	 to	 fulfil	 their	 statutory	requirements.	This	includes	the	appointment	of	professional	services	firms	to	act	as	 company	 secretary,	 outsourcing	 some	 part	 of	 the	 work	 to	 the	 firms,	 or	retaining	 them	 as	 back-up	 support.55	As	 UK	 law	 does	 not	 require	 a	 company	secretary	 be	 a	 full-time	 employee	 or	 an	 individual	 person,	 a	 body	 corporate	providing	 secretarial	 services	 can	be	 appointed	 as	 the	 company	 secretary.	The	benefit	of	having	a	corporate	company	secretary	is	that	it	provides	flexibility	by	enabling	more	than	one	person	to	represent	the	company	and	also	gives	access	to	a	more	extensive	knowledge	base.	Similarly,	a	professional	firm	in	the	form	of	a	 partnership	 or	 limited	 liability	 partnership	 (LLP)	 can	 also	 provide	 such	services.	Professional	 services	 firms	can	have	greater	expertise	and	knowledge	in	 particular	 areas	 of	 governance	 rules,	 such	 as	 the	 listing	 and	 compliance	requirements	 for	 stock	 exchanges.	 A	 company	does	 not	 need	 to	 employ	 a	 full-time	person	to	hold	the	office	and	can	contract	the	service	out	to	a	professional	firm	 to	 be	more	 cost-effective.	 If	 a	 company	 needs	 specialised	 knowledge	 -	 in	financial	 law,	for	example	-	a	 law	firm	can	provide	the	service.	A	lawyer	can	be	retained	by	a	company	to	hold	the	office	of	company	secretary.	A	company	faced	with	 budgetary	 constraints	 may	 not	 wish	 to	 employ	 a	 full-time	 company	secretary.	 Such	 retainers	 are	 generally	 welcomed	 by	 law	 firms	 because	 they	allow	 the	 law	 firms	 to	 become	 familiar	with	 the	 company	 and	 to	 forge	 a	 good	business	 relationship	with	 it.56	In	 such	 cases,	 the	 company	 is	 free	 to	design	 its	own	job	description,	and	the	professional	services	firm	can	provide	tailor-made	secretarial	 services.	 Market	 competition	 between	 firms	 allows	 companies	 to	obtain	cost-effective	secretarial	services.57		Two	 major	 issues	 arise.	 As	 with	 audit	 firms,	 market	 competition,	 a	 driver	thought	to	deliver	innovation,	can	compromise	the	element	of	independence	that	is	critical	for	the	gatekeeping	service.58	The	company	secretary’s	independence	is	fundamental	 to	 corporate	value	 creation.	However,	how	can	 secretarial	quality	be	 maintained	 and	 enhanced	 in	 this	 respect	 if	 the	 provision	 of	 the	 service	 is	subject	to	market	competition?	And	also,	how	should	a	company	secretary’s	act	and	 liability	 be	 attributed	 to	 the	 entity	 chosen	 by	 the	 professional	 services	providers	ie	a	company,	an	LLP,	or	a	partnership?	Is	it	to	the	company	or	the	firm	that	 provides	 the	 service,	 whether	 ordinary	 or	 limited	 liability	 partnership?	Professional	 services	 firms,	which	 potentially	 hold	 assets,	59	are	more	 likely	 to	become	 a	 source	 of	 compensation	 than	 an	 individual	 employee	 with	 limited																																																									55	This	is	the	case	especially	at	times	of	peak	company	secretarial	activity	e.g.	year-end/AGM.		56	Such	a	secondment	arrangement	can	provide	mutual	benefits.	See	Secondment	plan	of	mutual	benefit	(1992)	6(47)	Lawyer	6.	57	Christopher	 Humphrey	 ‘Regulating	 audit	 beyond	 the	 crisis:	 A	 critical	 discussion	 of	 the	 EU	Green	Paper’	(2011)	20(3)	The	European	Accounting	Review	431-457.	58	K	Houghton	and	C	Jubb	‘The	Market	for	financial	report	audits:	Regulation	of	and	competition	for	auditor	independence’	(2003)	25(3)	Law	and	Policy	299-321.	59	Companies	 can	provide	 indemnities	 to	 corporate	officers	 i.e.	 company	directors.	The	auditor	can	 also	 enter	 into	 a	 damage	 limitation	 agreement	with	 the	 audited	 company	 to	 control	 their	financial	if	not	reputational	exposure.		
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assets.	 Since	 April	 2005,	 companies	 can	 now	 freely	 provide	 indemnities	 to	 a	secretary	 as	 they	 see	 fit.	 If	 this	 can	 apply	 to	 professional	 services	 firms,	 some	controls	 should	 be	 established	 to	 ensure	 that	 service	 quality	 is	 not	 unduly	compromised.			
Maintaining	the	attribute	of	independence			Many	professional	services	firms	provide	a	 large	range	of	corporate	services	to	companies	 including	audit,	management,	 tax,	secretarial	and	legal	services.	The	issue	 of	 auditor	 independence	 has	 been	 raised	 when	 an	 auditor,	 acting	 as	 an	external	 gatekeeper,	 plays	 ‘low	ball’	 to	 gain	 other	 non-audit	 businesses.60	Such	market	competition	is	essential	to	service	innovation,	but	it	can	also	compromise	some	of	 the	key	 requirements	 for	maintaining	 good	 corporate	 governance	 and	creating	 corporate	 value.	When	 an	 independent	 audit	 is	 compromised,	market	competition	fails	to	deliver	value,	not	only	as	an	engine	for	innovation	but	also	as	an	 alternative	 regulatory	 tool	 for	 quality	 control.	 There	 are	 many	 ways	 to	regulate	 conflicts	 of	 interest	 when	 a	 professional	 services	 firm	 is	 engaged	 to	provide	 secretarial	 services.	 Company	 secretarial	 and	 other	 management	consulting	 services	 are	more	 likely	 to	be	 among	 the	 additional	businesses	 that	can	be	gained	from	audit	 ‘low-balling’	practices.	The	 issue	 is	how	to	make	sure	that	the	secretarial	services	offered	are	not	‘tagged	along’	with	the	audit	service.	Potential	conflicts	can	be	controlled	by	the	company	disclosing	such	a	‘tag-along’	relationship.	 Once	 the	 tag-along	 relationship	 has	 been	 disclosed,	 shareholder	approval	 can	 be	 required	 to	 further	 examine	 potential	 conflicts	 and	 the	 value	provided	 to	 the	 company.	 Furthermore,	 such	 approval	 may	 only	 need	 to	 be	required	for	services	provided	by	the	professional	services	firms	who	offer	a	full	range	 of	 services.	 Compulsory	 rotation	 can	 be	 introduced	 to	maintain	 a	more	arms-length	relationship	between	the	company	and	professional	services	firms.	Rotation	 can	 also	 increase	 independence	 since	 the	 company	 secretary	 will	 be	less	 attached	 to	 the	 management	 team,	 hence	 fostering	 a	 more	 arms-length	relationship.	 Furthermore,	 UK	 whistleblower	 protection	 law	 also	 applies	 to	contractors.	61	This	law	further	strengthens	professional	services	firms’	ability	to	maintain	the	quality	of	independence.		There	is	a	further	issue	regarding	a	service	firm’s	liability	for	conflicts	of	interest.	If,	 as	 discussed	 in	 the	 previous	 section,	 company	 secretaries	 are	 contracted	 to	provide	 value-added	 services	 such	 as	 appointment	 of	 non-executive	 directors,	designing	 a	 cost-effective	 reporting	 system	 or	 a	 compliance	 monitoring	programme,	a	professional	services	firm	providing	the	same	secretarial	services	to	competing	companies	at	the	same	time	may	give	rise	to	a	claim	for	a	conflict	of	interest.	 This	 is	 because	 the	 firms	 will	 have	 access	 to	 sensitive	 commercial	information	when	they	attend	board	meetings	and	can	access	information	about	subsidiaries	 through	 the	 governance	 protocol	 or	 by	 virtue	 of	 the	 subsidiary’s	
																																																								60	Patrick	Velte	 and	Carl-Christian	 Freidank,	 ‘The	 link	 between	 in-	 and	 external	 rotation	 of	 the	auditor	and	the	quality	of	financial	accounting	and	external	audit’	(2015)40(3)	European	Journal	of	Law	and	Economics	225-246. 61	In	the	US,	whistleblower	protection	is	not	given	to	at-will	employees.		
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constitution.62	For	 a	 partnership	 firm,	 an	 internal	 wall	 created	 to	 absolve	potential	 conflicts	may	be	needed.	 Such	a	 ‘Chinese	wall’	may	be	more	effective	for	 managing	 the	 risk	 of	 conflicts	 between,	 say,	 the	 audit	 and	 secretarial	departments.	Whether	such	a	wall	can	also	be	effective	when	raised	within	the	secretarial	department	is	questionable.	Would	disclosure	of	the	conflicts	by	the	firm	 and	 client	 consent	 be	 sufficient	 to	 remove	 the	 liability?	Disclosure	 by	 the	firm	 and	 client	 consent	 may	 remove	 the	 conflicts	 if	 the	 secretarial	 service	 is	purely	administrative,	but	if	the	work	includes	more	business-oriented	services,	for	 instance	 involvement	 in	 the	 recruitment	 of	 non-executive	 directors,	 such	conflicts	 are	 not	 easily	 removed.	 When	 a	 law	 firm	 being	 retained	 to	 act	 as	company	 secretary	 is	 tasked	 with	 monitoring	 a	 corporate	 compliance	programme,	this	may	create	a	conflict	if	the	firm	is	also	retained	by	a	competing	company.	The	UK	Companies	Act	 2006	 deals	with	 this	 problem	 to	 some	 extent.	 Under	 S	1214	 (2)	 of	 the	 Act,	 the	 auditor	 of	 a	 company	 cannot	 also	 be	 the	 company	secretary.	 But	 this	 does	 not	 completely	 solve	 the	 potential	 for	 conflicts	 of	interest.	 If	 a	 company	appoints	 an	 auditor	 from	a	particular	 services	 firm,	 this	would	not	prevent	 another	person	 from	 the	 same	 services	 firm	 from	acting	 as	company	secretary.			
Attribution	and	professional	firms’	liabilities			Clarifying	 firms’	 potential	 liabilities	 is	 crucial.	 For	 criminal	 liability,	 the	Companies	 Act	 2006	 imposes	 criminal	 liabilities	 on	 the	 company	 secretary,63	therefore	 not	 having	 a	 clear	 approach	 to	 identifying	 the	 person	 to	 be	 held	accountable	would	defeat	the	deterrent	effect	of	the	criminal	sanctions.	For	civil	liability,	 identifying	 the	 right	 accountable	 person	 affects	 the	 remedies	 to	 be	awarded	to	injured	parties.				
Criminal	liability			Secretarial	services	can	be	provided	by	a	professional	firm,	which	can	be	a	body	corporate	(including	a	 limited	 liability	partnership64)	or	a	partnership.	The	 law	states	 that	 it	 is	 possible	 for	 an	 officer	 of	 the	 company	 to	 be	 held	 civilly	 and	criminally	liable.	If	the	professional	services	firm	has	a	legal	personality,	such	as	a	 company	 or	 an	 LLP,	 the	 question	 is	 how	 to	 attribute	 liability	 to	 the	 person	appointed	 as	 the	 company	 secretary.	 Also,	 when	 a	 company	 engages	 a	partnership	 firm	 i.e.,	 an	 LLP	 (a	 separate	 legal	 entity	 from	 its	 members)	 to	provide	 services,	 who	 is	 the	 person,	 in	 fact	 and	 in	 law,	 appointed	 to	 hold	 the	office	of	company	secretary?																																																											62	Ben	Walther	 ‘Bylaw	 governance’	 (2014)	 20	 Fordham	 Journal	 of	 Corporate	 &	 Financial	 Law	399-	459.	63	For	instance,	CA	2006,	s	26(3),	s	32(3),	s	425,	s	451,	and	Part	36	(Offences	under	the	Companies	Acts).		64	Limited	Liability	Partnerships	Act	2000	s1(2).	
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In	 the	 UK,	 a	 body	 corporate	 can	 be	 made	 criminally	 liable.	65	Under	 the	Companies	Act	 06,	when	 a	 person	 is	 an	 officer	 of	 another	 company,	 he	 or	 she	does	not	commit	an	offence	as	an	officer	in	default	unless	one	of	the	company’s	officers	 is	 in	 default.	 The	 provision	 can	 be	 taken	 to	 mean	 that	 the	 company	providing	 the	 secretarial	 services,	 by	 holding	 the	 office	 of	 company	 secretary,	cannot	 be	 held	 criminally	 liable	 under	 the	 Act	 unless	 a	 director	 of	 the	professional	 services	 firm	 is	 identified	 as	 an	 officer	 in	 default	 by	 authorising,	permitting,	participating	in,	or	failing	to	take	all	reasonable	steps	to	prevent	the	contravention.	Nevertheless,	a	director	of	a	professional	services	firm	may	not	be	personally	involved	in	the	provision	of	the	service,	and	in	that	case	the	director’s	firm	will	not	be	held	criminally	liable.	The	current	provisions	of	the	Act	can	make	the	application	of	the	attribution	rules	confusing.		When	 the	 services	 firm	 is	 a	 partnership	 or	 limited	 liability	 partnership,	 an	individual	member	 of	 that	 firm	will	 serve	 as	 the	 company	 secretary	 and	 thus,	criminal	 liability	 is	 assumed	 by	 the	 individual	 rather	 than	 the	 firm.	 However,	because	 a	 limited	 liability	 partnership	 acquires	 a	 separate	 legal	 identity,	 if	 the	company	engages	 the	services	 firm	rather	 than	an	 individual	 from	the	services	firm,	 a	 similar	 question	 can	 arise.	 Neither	 the	 Act	 and	 nor	 case	 law	 have	 yet	considered	 such	 a	 situation.	 A	 clear	 legal	 framework	 on	 attributing	 individual	behaviour	or	 liability	 to	 the	 entity	 (or	 association)	of	 the	professional	 services	firms	should	be	introduced.		
Civil	liability		In	terms	of	civil	liability,	the	company	or	its	shareholders66		through	a	derivative	claim	can	pursue	compensation	claims	or	a	claim	to	account	 for	profits	against	the	 firm	 and/or	 the	 individual	 from	 the	 firm	 providing	 the	 service.	 If	 the	professional	services	firm	is	a	body	corporate	such	as	a	company,	claims	can	be	made	against	the	company.	If	the	firm	is	an	entity	other	than	a	company,	claims	in	 contract	 or	 in	 tort	 brought	 to	 obtain	 compensation	 will	 depend	 on	 the	organisational	 form	 of	 the	 firm	 –	 whether	 the	 individual	 is	 liable	 or	 all	 the	members	of	the	partnership	could	be	claimed	against.	If	an	LLP	is	retained	to	act	as	 the	 company	 secretary,	 the	 contract	 is	 between	 the	 company	 and	 the	 LLP,	which	 is	 a	 body	 corporate	 under	 UK	 law.	 An	 action	 for	 damages	 should	 be	brought	 against	 the	 LLP.	 There	 can	 be	 an	 indemnity	 provision	 in	 the	 contract.		Yet,	an	action	in	tort	can	be	brought	against	the	individual	person	providing	the	service.		
Part	 IV	 Transnational	 governance	 and	 combination	 with	 the	 office	 of	
general	counsel		
Transnational	governance	and	the	resulting	synergies		There	 are	 a	 number	 of	 jurisdictions	 that	 require	 the	 office	 of	 company																																																									65	Criminal	Justice	Act	1993	s	52	and	Enterprise	Act	2002	s	188.	66	CA	2006	Part	II.	
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secretary.67	As	 multinational	 companies	 are	 becoming	 the	 main	 providers	 of	goods	 and	 services,	 the	 company	 secretaries’	 tasks	 are	 to	 design	 effective	subsidiary	 governance	 framework	 to	mitigate	harms	 and	 to	 create	 governance	synergies.	 These	 synergies	 are	 delivered	 in	 the	 situation	 of	 actual	 or	 potential	joint	 law	 enforcement	 actions	 against	 the	 multinational	 companies.	 In	 actual	joint	 law	 enforcement,	 company	 secretaries	 are	 the	 first	 contact	 point	 for	responding	 to	regulatory	and	enforcement	enquiries	across	many	 jurisdictions.	In	potential	joint	law	enforcement	actions,	their	role	is	to	ensure	that	measures,	as	 such	 a	 subsidiary	 governance	 framework, 68 	are	 in	 place	 to	 prevent	enforcement	actions	or	to	defer	an	enforcement	action	in	the	case	of	a	deferred	enforcement	action	agreement.69		Within	 a	 multinational	 company,	 if	 general	 counsel	 also	 serves	 as	 company	secretary	the	legal	office	can	be	organised	to	include	the	company	secretaries	of	subsidiaries	 incorporated	 in	 different	 jurisdictions.	 Many	 UK	 companies	 have	combined	the	offices	of	company	secretary	and	corporate	counsel.70	Of	the	FTSE	100	companies	surveyed	in	a	census,71	70.2%	of	the	company	secretaries	held	a	legal	 qualification.	 Under	 a	 subsidiary	 governance	 framework,	 the	 subsidiary	company	 secretaries	 can	 provide	 needed	 information	 (e.g.	 a	 certificate	 of	political	donations)	to	the	general	counsel	of	the	parent	company	and	can	assist	the	 general	 counsel	with	 implementing	procedures	 as	 required	by	 law	 (e.g.	 an	anti-bribery	programme)	for	the	subsidiary	companies.	A	governance	structure	designed	 to	 allow	 the	 company	 secretary	 of	 the	 parent	 company	 to	 supervise,	through	 a	 reporting	 line,	 subsidiary	 companies’	 secretaries	 can	 effectively	ensure	 improved	 information-sharing	 across	 the	 group	 organisation.	 In	increasing	 joint	 enforcement	 by	 multi-jurisdictional	 enforcement	 agencies,	 a	global	 settlement	 agreement	 with	 a	 reform	 programme	 would	 be	 cost-saving	strategy	 for	 a	 defaulting	 company.	 This	 combination	 of	 the	 two	 offices	 would	make	it	easier	for	monitored	parent	companies	to	conduct	due	diligence	on	other	group	 affiliates.72	A	 general	 counsel	 or	 a	 legal	 officer	 is	 not	 required	 in	 the	UK	and	 in	 many	 other	 jurisdictions,	 yet	 many	 large	 companies	 and	 multinational	companies	 have	 general	 counsel	 offices	 or	 legal	 departments	 that	manage	 the	company’s	 legal	 affairs.	 If	 a	 general	 counsel	 or	 legal	 officer	 is	 not	 a	 legally	installed	officer	within	the	organisation,	 this	person	may	not	have	access	to,	or	the	power	to	obtain	corporate	information.	Legally,	the	general	counsel	does	not	have	access	to	the	boardroom,	but	such	access	can	be	gained	through	becoming	the	company	secretary.	Thus,	the	general	counsel	may	request	information	from																																																									67	Ireland,	Australia,	New	Zealand,	Hong	Kong,	Singapore,	China	and	USA	(ie	State	of	Delaware	under	s	142(a)	of	the	Delaware	General	Corporation	Law).	68	Federico	Mazzacuva	‘Justifications	and	Purposes	of	Negotiated	Justice	for	Corporate	Offenders:	Deferred	and	Non-Prosecution	Agreements	in	the	UK	and	US	Systems	of	Criminal	Justice’	(2014)	78	(3)	Journal	of	Criminal	Law	249-262.	69	The	 company	 secretary	 can	 also	 be	 the	 designated	 person	 to	monitor	 a	 deferred	 statement	programme.			70	Ian	 Maurice	 of	 Egon	 Zehnder	 discusses	 the	 relationship	 between	 General	 Counsel	 and	Company	 Secretary	 and	 describes	 the	 UK	 trend	 to	 split	 these	 roles	http://www.egonzehnder.com/files/the_general_counsel_and_the_board.pdf	71	The	census	was	carried	out	in	2004	by	Equiniti.		72	Deborah	 DeMott	 ‘The	 Crucial	 But	 (potentially)	 precarious	 position	 of	 the	 chief	 compliance	officer’	(2013)	8	Brookings	Journal	of	Corporate	Finance	and	Compliance	Law	57-70.	
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a	subsidiary	company’s	 in-house	counsel	who	does	not	have	the	legal	power	to	access	 the	 company’s	 information.	 However,	 a	 company	 secretary	 who	 is	 an	officer	 of	 the	 company	 would	 have	 such	 power,	 and	 obtaining	 corporate	information	such	as	records	or	sales	data	would	not	need	to	be	authorised	by	the	executive	directors	-	to	whom	general	counsel	is	affiliated.		UK	companies	are	required	to	implement	internal	procedures	under	various	acts	to	 protect	 the	 stakeholders	 of	 the	 company	 and	 safeguard	 the	 interests	 of	 the	general	 public.	 Companies	 are	 required	 to	 put	 in	 place	 health	 and	 safety	procedures	 to	 protect	 employees	 and	 to	 implement	 an	 anti-corruption	 system	within	 the	 organisation,	 including	 subsidiary	 companies	 incorporated	 in	 other	jurisdictions.	 Company	 secretaries	 involved	 in	 the	 design	 and	 the	implementation	 of	 these	 procedures	 who	 work	 collaboratively	 with	 other	company	secretaries	of	 the	same	group	under,	say,	 the	general	counsel’s	office,	would	 ensure	 that	 the	 norms	 of	 the	 parent	 company	 are	 effectively	 diffused	through	 the	 subsidiary	 companies.	 These	 norms	 can	 also	 result	 in	 a	 spillover	effect	 on	 the	 business	 environment	 surrounding	 the	 subsidiary	 companies.	These	 procedural	 mechanisms	 not	 only	 create	 a	 safe	 harbour	 if	 there	 is	misconduct	 by	 an	 employee	 or	 an	 agent	 of	 the	 company	 and	 its	 subsidiaries.	They	may	be	required	by	regulators	as	a	condition	for	a	deferred	prosecution.73		
The	problem	of	wearing	two	hats		When	a	person	serves	as	both	general	counsel	and	company	secretary	of	a	single	company,	 it	 is	difficult	 to	make	a	precise	distinction	between	the	functions	and	roles	of	the	two	posts.	The	law	requires	a	company	to	appoint	a	secretary,	but	it	does	not	require	general	counsel.	Yet	a	general	counsel	acts	as	an	 independent	legal	 adviser	 to	 a	 company,	 and	 legal	 advice	 given	 to	 the	 company	 receives	privileged	protection	against	disclosure.74	A	 company	secretary,	however,	 is	 an	officer	of	the	company	rather	than	an	independent	legal	adviser	and	any	advice	given,	even	 if	 legal,	 is	not	protected	by	 the	 legal	privilege	rules.	Legal	privilege	rules	 confer	 protection	 on	 companies	 against	 the	 disclosure	 of	 internal	communications	otherwise	required	by	third	parties.	A	company	secretary	may	have	a	duty	to	report	to	the	regulator	and	may	make	a	public	interest	disclosure	of	misconduct	 by	 the	 company,	 or	 an	 insider	 of	 the	 company,	 to	 the	 regulator	while	 receiving	protection.	Yet,	 general	 counsel	does	not	have	 such	a	duty	and	may	not	make	a	public	interest	disclosure	while	receiving	protection.	Therefore,	it	is	understandable	for	a	general	counsel	to	hold	the	office	of	company	secretary,	even	 if	 not	 all	 of	 the	 advice	 given	 to	 the	 board	 or	 individual	 officers	 of	 the	company	in	internal	communications	can	be	classified	as	legal	advice.	There	is	an	advantage	 for	 companies	 to	 appoint	 a	 legally	 qualified	 person	 to	 act	 as	 the	company	secretary.		
																																																									73	Jessica	Naima	Dijlani	 ‘The	British	 importation	 of	 American	 corporate	 compliance’	 (2011)	 76	Brookings	Law	Review	303-	341.	74	Three	 Rivers	 District	 Council	 -v-	 Bank	 of	 England	 (No.	 5)	 [2003]	 QB	 1556	 and	 Three	 Rivers	
District	Council	-v-	The	Bank	of	England	(No.	6)	[2005]	1	AC	610.	
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Communication	 privilege	 against	 disclosure	 given	 to	 the	 company	
secretary		The	Corporate	Governance	Code	specifies	that	the	company	secretary	should	be	accessible	to	board	members	for	advice.75	If	so,	would	advice	given	to	individual	non-executive	directors		on	their	rights	and	duties	constitute	legal	advice?	Such	protection	may	encourage	non-executive	directors	to	seek	the	advice	of	general	counsel	 or	 outside	 counsel	 on	 an	 issue.	 Based	 on	 such	 advice,	 non-executive	directors	 can	 make	 legally	 informed	 decisions.	 Without	 such	 legal	 privilege	protection,	 members	 of	 the	 board	 would	 not	 only	 be	 less	 willing	 to	 use	 the	company	secretary	for	internal	governance	advice	but	also	less	willing	to	share	information	with	them.		Should	 privilege	 protection	 cover	 internal	 communications	 between	 a	 non-lawyer	 company	 secretary	 and	 the	 company,	 or	 the	 individual	 directors,	 to	enhance	corporate	value?	In	all	the	work	carried	out	by	the	company	secretary	of	a	 listed	 companies,	 they	 must	 put	 on	 legal	 spectacles	 when	 providing	 their	services;	 be	 it	 formulating	 governance	 protocols	 and	 instituting	 reporting	systems	 to	 improve	 governance	 standards	 or	 evaluating	 governance	 strategies	and	best	practice.	They	also	act	as	a	liaison	between	the	board	and	management.	Without	such	protection,	officers	may	be	discouraged	from	seeking	advice	from	a	non-lawyer	 company	 secretary.	 If	 a	non-lawyer	 company	 secretary	 is	not	used	by	other	officers	 for	 internal	advice	this	would	reduce	the	company	secretary’s	ability	 to	 give	 advice	 on	 governance	 issues.	 In	 particular,	 if	 the	 company	secretary	acts	as	chief	of	staff	to	the	chairman	and	also	as	the	executive	and	non-executive	 directors’	 link	 to	 the	 chairman,	 protection	 given	 to	 their	communications	would	enhance	greater	 information-sharing	at	 that	 level.	Such	protection	 (e.g.	 providing	 confidentiality	 for	 internal	 communications)	 would	level	 the	 playing-field	 for	 non-legally	 qualified	 company	 secretary	 who	 can	provide	an	enhanced	level	of	governance	compared	with	a	general	counsel	who	is	normally	attached	to	the	CEO’s	office.	
Conclusion		The	 transformation	 of	 the	 UK	 company	 secretary	 from	 a	 mere	 servant	 to	 a	corporate	 gatekeeper	 has	 been	 spurred	 on	 by	 the	 development	 of	 capital	markets	that	have	been	demanding	higher	levels	of	corporate	transparency	and	board	 independence.	 Soft-law	 based	 corporate	 governance	 has	 enhanced	 the	gatekeeping	 functions	 of	 the	 company	 secretary	 in	 facilitating	 corporate	transparency	 through	 law	 and	 policy	 compliance	 and	 board	 independence	through	 assisting	 oversight	 by	 non-executive	 directors.	 Their	 attribute	 of	independence	can	benefit	from	a	soft-law	approach	to	regulation.	A	professional	code	 of	 conduct	 can	 be	 developed	 to	 provide	 situational	 guidance	 on	 the	attribute	of	independence.	The	Corporate	Governance	Code	can	include	a	regime	on	the	appointment	and	removal	of	a	company	secretary	–	including	the	right	of	representation	to	the	board	of	a	removed	company	secretary,	and	on	conflicts	of																																																									75	Corporate	Governance	Code,	B	5.2.	
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interest	that	may	arise	when	appointing	a	professional	services	firm	as	company	secretary.	 More	 definite	 rules	 on	 corporate	 attribution	 in	 civil	 and	 criminal	liabilities	 should	 be	 introduced	 to	 increase	 the	 utility	 of	 professional	 services	firms	 in	 the	provisions	of	 such	a	 gatekeeping	 service.	 Some	amendment	 to	 the	current	 provisions	 in	 the	 Companies	 Act	 2006	 should	 be	 made	 to	 avoid	 a	confusing	reading.	While	combining	the	offices	of	general	counsel	and	company	secretary	can	yield	governance	synergies,	e.g.	 through	a	subsidiary	governance	framework,	 a	 non-legally	 qualified	 secretary	 can	 also	 bring	 a	 different	 set	 of	skills	to	companies	in	assisting	the	governance	programme.	Giving	protection	to	communications	 between	 the	 company	 secretary	 and	 board	 members	 can	increase	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 company	 secretary	 to	 give	 guidance	 in	 matters	 of	governance.		
			
